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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
OF IDAHO,

)

)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

)
)

V.

NO. 41477
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2010-14353

)

JESSE ELIAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE
TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Based upon the evidence presented by the State, the jury could conclude that
Jesse Elias entered uninvited into the home of a female acquaintance, went up into her
bedroom and, while she was asleep, penetrated her vagina with his finger.

He was

charged with violating Idaho Code § 18-6608 by committing the crime of penetration by
a foreign object 1 under alternative legal theories: 1) that he acted against the victim's

1

The crime's official title is "Forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object."
I.C. § 18-6608.

1

will by the use of force; or 2) where the alleged victim was unable to give consent due to
temporary unsoundness of mind.2 A jury found Mr. Elias guilty (although the jurors were
not asked to determine under which theory he committed the crime). Mr. Elias asserts
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he violated I.C. § 18-6608 under
either of these theories.

He further asserts that his actions are not prohibited by I.C.

§ 18-6608 because the legislature has omitted penetration occurring while the alleged

victim sleeps as a means by which the crime can be committed. Mr. Elias asserts that
this Court should find that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence upon which a
jury could conclude that Mr. Elias committed the crime of penetration by a foreign object
and should vacate his conviction.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Jesse Elias had committed the
crimes of penetration by a foreign object and burglary. (R., pp.13-14.) Mr. Elias waived
his right to a preliminary hearing, was bound over into the district court, and eventually
an Amended Information was filed charging him with the above crimes. (R., pp.25-29,
42-43.)

The State alleged that Mr. Elias committed penetration by a foreign object

"against that person's will by use of force or where that person was unable to give
consent due to temporary unsoundness of mind, to wit: by inserting his finger(s) inside
the vaginal opening of Shantell Steciuk, while she was sleeping and against her will ... ".
Mr. Elias pied not guilty and his case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.30-32, 59-64.)
Ms. Steciuk testified that she was an acquaintance of Mr. Elias, meeting him
through his sister who often visited her boyfriend living next door to Ms. Steciuk. (Tr.
2

Mr. Elias was also charged with and convicted of burglary - a conviction he does not
challenge in this appeal.
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Trial, p.31, L 1 - p.38, L.1.) Although he had been a guest inside her triplex apartment
in the past, Mr. Elias did not have permission to enter Ms. Steciuk's residence without
asking her first. (Tr. Trial, p.38, L.18

p.39, L.9.) After locking her doors, Ms. Steciuk

went to bed at about 10:30 on the night of July 19, 2010, with her two small children
lying next to her. (Tr. Trial, p.31, Ls.16-21, p.39, L.10 - p.40, L.22.) When asked what

she remembered next, Ms. Steciuk testified, "I woke up with Jesse sitting on the end of
my bed, and he had his fingers inside my vagina." (Tr. Trial, p.40, Ls.20-24.) She then
rolled onto her right side and felt Mr. Elias touch her a second time on "like my butt right
before, you know, before my vagina" but "[i]t didn't go in." (Tr. Trial, p.41, L.23 - p.42,
Ms. Steciuk testified that she then wrapped herself in a blanket and Mr. Elias
was denied in his attempt to touch her a third time. (Tr. Trial, p.43, L.13 - p.44, L.22.)3
The jury found Mr. Elias guilty of both penetration by a foreign object and
burglary. (R., p.91.) The district court sentenced Mr. Elias to a total unified term of fifty
years, with ten years fixed, for the penetration by a foreign object conviction, and a
concurrent term of ten years fixed for the burglary conviction, with the court retaining
jurisdiction.

(R., pp.101-104; Tr., 1/31/11, p.14, Ls.6-20.)

Mr. Elias successfully

completed his rider and the district court placed him on probation for a period of
fourteen years. (R., pp.113-117; Tr., 7/20/11, p.27, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Elias filed a Notice of

3

The jury heard additional testimony from Officer Kevin Schmeckpeper, the
investigating officer, Dr. Henry Amon, Jr., a doctor who examined Ms. Steciuk finding "a
relatively minor abrasion on the right side, on the inside of [Ms. Steciuk's] labium and
her inner lips," Shirley Bechtel, Mr. Elias' sister, and Mr. Elias himself who testified that
he did enter Ms. Steciuk's apartment, although he denied any criminal intent when
doing so, and who also denied penetrating Ms. Steciuk's vagina. (Tr. Trial, p.68, L.15 p.86, L.17, p.95, L.20-p.106, L.14, p.111, L.15-p.132, L.18, p.134, L.7-p.182, L.19.)

3

Appeal timely from the district court's Retained Jurisdiction Disposition and Notice of
RighttoAppeal. 4 (R., pp.113-117, 121-124.)
Applying relevant principles of statutory interpretation and this Court's recent
holding in State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412 (2013), the Court of Appeals held that I.C.
§ 18-6608 does not prohibit penetration by a foreign object where the victim is merely
asleep, and the Court further held that the "extrinsic force" standard applies where the
State alleges the penetration was against the will of the victim by the use of force. State
v. Elias, 2013 Opinion No. 43 (July 12, 2013) (hereinafter Opinion).

The Court of

Appeals ultimately concluded that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support a conviction under either the theory that Mr. Elias used force against the alleged
victim's will, or the theory that the victim was of unsound mind merely because she was
asleep. Id. This Court has granted the State's Petition for Review.

4

Although Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) has since been amended, at the time the district
court filed the Sentencing Disposition and Notice of Right to Appeal in January of 2011,
the time to file a Notice of Appeal enabling a challenge to all aspects of the conviction
and sentence was enlarged by the time the district court retained jurisdiction. See
I.AR. 14(a) (2010). Therefore, Mr. Elias' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
ripe for review in this appeal.
4

ISSUE
Should this Court vacate Mr. Elias' conviction for unlawful penetration by a foreign
object because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction?
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ARGUMENT
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Elias' Conviction For Unlawful Penetration By A Foreign
Object Because There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction

A

Introduction
The Idaho legislature has described three means by which the crime of

penetration by a foreign object can be committed under Idaho Code § 18-6608:
1) against the victim's will by the use of force, violence or duress, or the threat of force;
2) where the victim is incapable of giving lawful consent due to unsoundness of mind;
and 3) where the victim is prevented from resisting due to an intoxicating, narcotic or
anesthetic substance. LC. § 18-6608. Unlike similar crimes which are committed at the
point of penetration such as rape and male rape, the legislature has omitted from I.C.
§ 18-6608 any language describing the commission of unlawful penetration by a foreign
object occurring due to the victim merely being asleep. Compare I.C. § 18-6608 with
LC.§ 18-6101(6)(a) and with I.C. § 18-6108(7). Because the evidence presented and
believed by the jury demonstrated that the act of digital penetration occurred while
Ms. Steciuk was asleep, was not accomplished by the use of force or threat of force,
and Ms. Steciuk did not suffer from any unsoundness of mind, the State presented
insufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias' conviction for penetration by a foreign object,
requiring this Court to vacate that conviction.
B.

A Conviction Founded Upon Insufficient Evidence Violates A Defendant's Right
To Due Process Of Law And Must Be Vacated
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State

of Idaho from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. Const. Amd. XIV. "Just as 'Conviction upon a charge not made would be

6

denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a
man without evidence of his guilt." Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206
(1960) (quoting De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (additional
citations omitted).) "It is axiomatic that a conviction upon a charge not made or upon a
charge not tried constitutes a denial of due process." Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307,
314 (1979) (citations omitted).
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised
for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995).
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-62 (Ct App. 2008).
C.

Idaho Code § 18-6608 Does Not Criminalize Mr. Elias' Actions
Idaho appellate Courts freely review issues of statutory interpretation. State v.

Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 418 (2013) (citing State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 851 (2012)).
When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words used in the statute
and construes the pertinent provisions of the statute as a whole. Bradbury v. Idaho

Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009). The Court must not interpret a statute in
such a way as to render any of its terms mere surplusage; rather, the Court must
construe the statute as a whole. Id. "It is a fundamental law of statutory construction
that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed together, to the end that the
legislative intent will be given effect." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689-690 (2004)
(citing State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367 cerl. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984)). "Where

7

a statute with respect to one subject contains a certain provision, the omission of such
provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a
different intention existed." Id at 690 (citing Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 164 (1979)).
The power to correct a socially or otherwise unsound statute lied with the legislature,
not the judiciary.

Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,

892-893 (2011 ).
1.

Idaho Code § 18-6608 Does Not Criminalize Penetration By A Foreign
Object Where The Person Whose Genital Or Anal Opening Is Penetrated
ls Merely Asleep When The Penetration Occurs

The evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Mr. Elias
inserted his finger into the alleged victim's vagina while she slept. However, the Idaho
legislature has omitted this behavior as a means by which a person can commit the
crime of unlawful penetration by a foreign object.

Idaho Code § 18-6608 reads as

follows:
Every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or
abuse, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal
opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device, against
the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats of
immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of
execution, or where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of
mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent, or where
the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or
anesthetic substance, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than life.
I.C. § 18-6608. By its plain language, this code section describes a mens rea ("for the
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse"), and an actus reas ("causes the
penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person, by any
object, instrument or device"). I.C. § 18-6608. In addition, this code section describes
three means by which the penetration becomes unlawful:

8

1) Against the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats
of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of
execution;
2) Where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether
temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent; or
3) Where the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or
anesthetic substance.
LC. § 18-6608. Notably absent from this code section is any mention of the penetration
becoming unlawful because the person whose genital or anal opening is penetrated is
asleep. Id. Under a plain reading of I. C. § 18-6608, penetration by a foreign object is
not unlawful merely because the penetration occurred while the victim was asleep.
Applying principles of statutory interpretation beyond simply reading the plain
language of the statute leads to the same conclusion.

Under the doctrine of in pari

materia 5 , the absence of language in the penetration by a foreign object statute (I.C.
§ 18-6608) criminalizing penetration while the victim is sleeping, where such language

is specifically included in both the rape (I.C. § 18-6101) and the male rape (I.C.
§ 18-6108) statutes, counsels toward the conclusion that the legislature has purposely

omitted penetration occurring while the victim is merely asleep from the conduct
prohibited by I.C. § 18-6608. In contrast to I.C. § 18-6608, both the rape and male rape
5

The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means
that each legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the
same matter or subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to
the same subject. Such statutes are taken together and construed as one
system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be
inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by
one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious
in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the
intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and
so far as still in force brought into harmony by interpretation.
State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382 (1999) (quoting Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho
State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1, 4 (1993).)
9

statutes contain explicit provisions describing the crime as occurring where the victim is
merely asleep.
Idaho Code§ 18-1601 states in pertinent part,
Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or
vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female
under any one (1) of the following circumstances:
(6) Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act. As used
in this section, "unconscious of the nature of the act" means incapable of
resisting because the victim meets one (1) of the following conditions:
(a) Was unconscious or asleep;
(b) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act
occurred.
I.C. § 18-6101(6). Likewise, Idaho Code§ 18-6108 states in pertinent part,
Male rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral or anal
opening of another male, with the perpetrator's penis, for the purpose of
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, under any of the following
circumstances:
(7) Where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act,
and this is known to the accused.
LC.§ 18-6108(7).
In both of these statutes, perpetration of the crime due to the victim being
unconscious is listed as a specific means of committing the crime. This means is listed
separately from and in addition to the use of force or threat of force, unsoundness of
mind, and intoxication, which are all listed as separate means of committing both rape
and male rape in their respective statutes.

§§ 18-6108(3)-(6).

See I.C. §§ 18-6101 (3)-(5) and I.C.

The omission of language criminalizing penetration by a foreign

object where the alleged victim is merely asleep demonstrates that the legislature
specifically omitted the victim's status as being merely asleep (and not intoxicated or of
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unsound mind) as being a means by which a person can commit the crime of
penetration by a foreign objection.
The legislative history further supports this conclusion. Prior to July of 2002, I.C.
§ 18-6608 prohibited penetration by a foreign object only where it occurred against the

victim's will by the use of force or threat of force. I.C. § 18-6608 (2001 ). The statute
was amended, however, in 2002 to add the language found today criminalizing
penetration by a foreign object where either the victim is incapable of giving consent
due to being of unsound mind or is prevented from resisting by an intoxicating, narcotic
or anesthetic substance.

Compare I.C. § 18-6608 (2001) with I.C. § 18-6608 (2002);

see also 2002 Idaho Laws Ch. 360 (S.B. 1354).
The Statement of Purpose articulating the reason for the 2002 amendment reads
as follows:
The purpose of this bill is to close a gap in Idaho's sex crimes code,
brought to our attention by a victim. It amends 18-6608, the law on
forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign object, to include victims who
are incapable of resistance because of unsoundness of mind, narcotics or
anesthetic substances.
2002 Idaho Laws Ch. 360 (S.B. 1354) (Statement of Purpose RS 11734). At the time of
this amendment, both the rape and male rape statutes included provisions criminalizing
penile penetration where the victim was of unsound mind, or where the victim was
prevented from resistance through the use of intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic
substances, in addition to criminalizing the behavior where the victim was asleep or
unconscious of the nature of the act.

See I.C. § 18-6101 (2),(4),(5) (2001 ); I.C.

§ 18-6108(1),(4),(5) (2001). Thus, the legislature was aware of a "gap in Idaho's sex
crimes code" and amended I.C. § 18-6608 to include "victims who are incapable of
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resistance because of unsoundness of mind, narcotic or anesthetic substances," but
omitted victims who do not consent due to being asleep or unconscious of the act.
In sum, the Idaho legislature has not criminalized penetration by the use of a
foreign object where the victim is merely asleep.
2.

Under The Use Of Force Theory, Idaho Code § 18-6608 Requires The
State To Prove The Defendant Used An Amount Of Force In Excess Of
The Amount Of Force Necessary To Accomplish The Penetration Itself

In order to sustain a conviction for violation of I.C. § 18-6608 under the use of
force theory, the State must prove that the defendant: 1) for the purpose of sexual
arousal, gratification, or abuse; 2) causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital
or anal opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device; 3) against the
victim's will; and 4) by the use of force or violence or by duress; or 4a), by threats of
immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution. LC.
§ 18-6608. Under a plain reading of the statute, the State must prove both penetration,
and the use of force (as well as the other elements); thus, giving effect to every word
and clause and avoiding interpreting the statute as containing surplusage, I.C.
§ 18-6608 requires the State to prove that the defendant used some amount of force in
addition to the amount necessary to accomplish the penetration itself.
In State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412 (2013), this Court analyzed what is now Idaho
Code § 18-6101 (4), 6 the statute criminalizing rape occurring by the use of force.

Id.

Idaho Code§ 18-6101(4) reads as follows:
Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or
vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female
under any one (1) of the following circumstances:
6

The statute in question was designated as I.C. § 18-6101 (3) when Mr. Elias was
charged but has since been renumbered as I.C. § 18-6101 (4).
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(4) Where she resists but her resistance is overcome by force or violence.
§ 18-6101(4). The Jones Court set out to determine whether the "intrinsic force" or

the "extrinsic force" standard applies to the forcible rape statute. The Court described
"extrinsic force" by the definition adopted by the Washington Court of Appeals in
State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 538 (Wash. App. 1989), which stated,

The force to which reference is made in forcible compulsion "is not
the force inherent in the act of penetration but the force used or
threatened
overcome or prevent resistance by the female." ...
Where the degree of force exerted by the perpetrator is the distinguishing
feature between second and third degree rape, to establish second
degree rape the evidence must be sufficient to show that the force exerted
was directed at overcoming the victim's resistance and was more than that
which is normally required to achieve penetration.
Jones, 154 Idaho at 421 (citing McKnight 774 P.2d at 535 (emphasis added) (citations

omitted)). "The intrinsic force standard, on the other hand, represents the more modern
trend.

It provides that any amount of force-even that which is inherent in

intercourse-can substantiate a charge of rape." Id. (emphasis added). Ultimately,
the Jones Court held that, "based upon the plain language of I.C. § 18-6101 [(4)] ... the
extrinsic force standard applies in Idaho" to the force or violence language used in that
statue. Id. at 422.
Although I.C. § 18-6101(4) requires a showing that the victim "resists but her
resistance is overcome by force or violence;) whereas I.C. § 18-6608 speaks of the

penetration being "against the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress," this
distinction does not render the extrinsic force standard inapplicable to I.C. § 18-6608.
The Jones Court did not rely upon the fact that the State is required to prove "use of
force" in addition to "resistance" in concluding that the extrinsic force standard; rather,
the Court relied upon the fact that the State was required to prove "use of force" in
13

addition to "penetration." Jones 154 Idaho at 421-422. The Court stated, "[w]ere we to

construe 'force' as encompassing the act of penetration itself, it would effectively render
the force element moot. Force would always be present and never have to be proven,
so long as there was sexual intercourse." Id. at 422.
Relying upon the Jones decision, the Court of Appeals held the use of force
theory under I.C. § 18-6608 requires a showing of "extrinsic force"; that is, the State
must demonstrate the defendant used an amount of force beyond that inherent in the
act of penetration itself. (Opinion, pp.4-11.) The Court recognized,
In order to uphold a conviction under section 18-6608 with facts such as
are presented here, this Court must either dispense of the force
requirement, finding penetration with an object occurring against the will of
the victim is sufficient to constitute criminal conduct, or add in language
similar to that found in the rape statutes, but missing from section
18-6608. It is the province of the Legislature to amend the statute to cover
the circumstances of this case and not within the power of this Court.
(Opinion, p.11.)

Mr. Elias asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted

I.C. § 18-6608.
The State articulates no cogent reason for this Court to find that a violation of
I.C. § 18-6608 can occur due solely to the fact that the victim did not consent to the
penetration. Relying upon a footnote in the Court of Appeals' decision, the State argues
that "[t]he Court of Appeals' interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-6608 . . . directly
contradicts the plain meaning of the statute's language and is clearly incompatible with
its legislative intent. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.6-7 (citing
Opinion, pp.7-8, fn.5.)

In the footnote in question, the Court of Appeals notes a

"foreseeable problem" with the statute because the amount of force used to cause
penetration will vary with the size of the object used. (Opinion, pp.7-8, fn.5.) However,
the Court correctly noted that it is for the legislature to fix this perceived problem. Id.

14

Although the State makes the assertion that the Court of Appeals interpreted the
statute in contradiction to its plain meaning and legislative intent, the State provides no
actual analysis of the literal words contained in the statute, and provides no actual
legislative history supporting its conclusory statement.
Brief in Support of Petition for Review.)

(See generally Respondent's

Rather, the State merely provides a colorful

hypothetical involving a baseball bat and argues, "some acts, by their very nature, are
inherently forceful, violent, and threatening to an outrageous degree." 7 (Respondent's
Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.7.)

Regardless of the degree of outrage a

particular act compels, it is for the legislature, not this Court, to pass legislation that
criminalizes behavior that is "inherently forceful, violent, and threatening to an
outrageous degree." See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho
889, 892-893 (2011 ). The State's argument has no merit.
The State further claims that the Court of Appeals misapplied the doctrine of in

pari materia, 8 arguing that there is a distinction between the "force" elements in
I.C. § 18-6101 and I.C. § 18-6608.

(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for

Review, pp.7-8.) The State reasons that under I.C. § 18-6101(4), the State is required

7

In reality, the same concern expressed by the Court of Appeals and relied upon by the
State for its specious argument, is present in both I.C. § 18-6101 (4) and I.C.
§ 18-6108(4). As a matter of biology, physics, and common sense, the amount of force
necessary to accomplish penile penetration is dependent upon the size and state of the
penis in question, relative to the size and state of the orifice in question, at the time of
the penetration. This indisputable reality does not demonstrate that this Court's
recognition in Jones that the extrinsic force standard applies to I.C. § 18-6101(4) (and
presumably I.C. § 18-6108(4)), is in contradiction of the plain meaning of these statutes
and is incompatible with legislative intent.
8
Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that the Court of Appeals applied the
doctrine of in pari materia to its determination that I. C. § 18-6608 does not criminalize
penetration by a foreign object where the alleged victim is merely asleep, rather than to
the use of the terms "force" in each statute. (Opinion, pp.4-8.)
15

to prove that the defendant used "force" in order to overcome the victim's resistance
and, therefore, "the extrinsic force standard is appropriate."

(Respondent's Brief in

Support of Petition for Review, p.8.) However, the State asserts, "under the forcible
sexual penetration statute, the state must show only that the assailant caused the
penetration by the use of force or violence; consent is a separate element."
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.)

Therefore, the State concludes that forcible sexual

penetration is merely a "specialized battery" which occurs whenever there is
nonconsensual penetration of the anus or vagina.

(Respondent's Brief in Support or

Petition for Review, pp.8-9.)
Again, the State's argument ignores the plain language of I.C. § 18-6608, and
misconstrues this Court's holding in Jones. By its plain language, the State must prove
that the defendant "for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse cause[d] the
penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person, by any
object, instrument or device, against the victim's will by use of force ... " I.C. § 18-6608.
The State must prove both penetration and that the penetration occurred "against the
victim's will by the use of force." The Jones Court recognized that if it were to construe
the "force" requirement as being proven merely due to the fact that penetration
occurred, the force element would be rendered moot as it would always be present.
Jones 154 Idaho at 422. The same problem plagues the State's argument in this case.
If this Court were to construe I.C. § 18-6608 as a "specialized battery" where in the
force element is necessarily proven by proof of penetration, the force element would be
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rendered moot 9 Such an interpretation is counter to principles of statutory construction
requiring this Court to interpret a statute consistently with the literal meaning of the
words contained therein, and to not interpret a statute in such as way as to render
included words as mere surplusage. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107,
116 (2009).
This Court should hold that, I.C. § 18-6608 requires the State to prove the
defendant used force in excess of that necessary to accomplish the act of penetration in
order to sustain a conviction under the use of force theory.
3.

Under The Unsoundness Of Mind Theory, The State Cannot Sustain A
Conviction Under I.C. § 18-6608 Merely By Demonstrating That The
Victim Is Asleep

The State has not argued that, under I.C. § 18-6608, it can demonstrate that an
alleged victim was of unsound mind due to the fact that they were unconscious or
asleep at the time of the penetration. (See Respondent's Brief; Respondent's Brief in
Support of Petition for Review.)

Idaho Code § 18-6608 cannot be interpreted as

allowing for a conviction under such a theory.
As the Court of Appeals held,
This Court has previously interpreted the meaning of "unsoundness of
mind" in the context of the rape statute. See State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 691,
52 P.3d 335 (Ct.App.2002). In Doe, we applied the rule of statutory
construction and concluded that "unsoundness of mind," as used in the
rape statute, refers to "mental disability caused by mental illness,
retardation or other abnormality." Id. at 693, 52 P.3d at 337. We relied on
the plain meaning of the term "unsound" as not physically healthy or whole
or having disease, abnormality, or defect such that usefulness is impaired.
9

In addition to being completely inconsistent with principles of statutory construction,
the State's "specialized battery" theory completely disregards the fact that the State
must prove the defendant acted "for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or
abuse," a purpose not required to be proven where a battery is charged. See
I.C. § 18-6608; I.C. § 18-903.
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Id. Under any interpretation of the term, we cannot find that being asleep
fits within the plain meaning of "unsoundness of mind." As there is no
other evidence showing a mental disability or abnormality on the part of
the victim in this case, the evidence is insufficient to uphold the conviction
under the second theory alleged by the State.
(Opinion, pp.11-12.) Mr. Elias asserts that this Court should adopt the Court of Appeals'
rationale and hold that, when read in pari materia, the legislature's use of the phrase,
"Where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether temporary
or permanent, of giving legal consent," found in I.C. § 18-6608, has the same meaning
as the phrase, "Where she is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, due to any
cause including, but not limited to, mental illness, mental disability or developmental
disability, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent," found in
I.C. § 18-6101(3).

Both phrases refer to the victim's lack of consent being due to a

mental illness, not to being asleep. Therefore, the State cannot sustain a conviction for
a violation of I. C. § 18-6608 under an unsoundness of mind theory merely by showing

that the victim is asleep.
D.

The State Presented No Evidence To Support A Finding That Mr. Elias
Committed A Crime Prohibited By Idaho Code § 18-6608
The State presented no evidence that Mr. Elias penetrated Ms. Steciuk's vagina

in a manner prohibited by I.C. § 18-6608. Ms. Steciuk described the event as follows:

A.
I woke up with Jesse sitting on the end of my bed, and he had his
fingers inside of my vagina.
Q.

About what time was this?

A.

Um, about 3:30.

Q.

In the morning?

A.

Yes.

Q.

This would be on July 20th then?
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A.

Yes.

What was - what was it that woke you up at 3:30 a.m.?
A.

Somebody touching me.

Q

What do you mean?

A.
Like not normally, you know, like I would roll over and my kids
would touch me, you know, that kind of stuff didn't wake me up, but he having his fingers inside of me.
Q

And when you woke up was there any pain associated with that?

A.
Yes. When I first felt it, I rolled over onto my right side, and I felt it
kind of like a razor cut kind of burn feeling from, and that's what really
woke me up.
Q.

This razor cut burning feeling, where did you feel it from?

A.

Inside my vagina.

Q.
And after you - did you roll onto your side or - well, first of all, how
were you positioned?

A.

I was laying on my back, and I had rolled over onto my right side.

Q.

And how were you dressed?

A.

I had a big T-shirt on.

Q.

Is that what you would customarily wear then is a nightgown?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

is that it? Is that all you had on?

A.

Yes.

When you woke up and his hands were where you described - his
hand was where you described where it was, um, where did you roll to?
Q.

A.

Onto my right side.
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Q.
And when you did that what happened to the hand that was inside
your vagina?

A
It moved when I rolled over, and then I felt it again after I rolled
over.
Q.

Describe the second time that you felt it.

A

It didn't go in, but I felt him touching me still.

Q.

Where did you feel him touching you the second time?

A

Um, on my - on my - like my butt right before, you know, my
vagina.
Q.

What side did you feel it touching? Was it the right side or your left

side?

A

It was on the back side.

Q.
And when this happened how was Mr. Elias positioned on the bed,
do you recall?

A

Yeah. He was sitting on the end of my bed to the left of me, kind of
sitting sideways with his right arm by me.

Q.

And were your kids in the same location on either side of you?

A.
Yes. I had my - I believe my daughter was on my left side, and my
son was on my right side.
Q.

Were they still asleep?

A.

Yes, they were.

Q.

What did you do after you felt him touch you a second time?

A.
Rolled over again onto my left side to cover myself completely with
my blanket.
Q.

What do you mean cover yourself with your blanket?

A.
Like wrap myself up like a hot dog kind of in my blanket so that way
he couldn't get in there again.
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What happened after you rolled the - after the second time you felt
him touch you?

Q.

A

He asked me if I knew who he was.

Q.

Describe how he went about asking you that

A.

He just said, "Do you know who I am? Do you know who I am?"

Q.

How many times did he say that, "Do you know who I am?"

A

About three.

Q.

And when he was saying this were you able to see his face at all?

A.
Um, it was pretty dark in my room. My T.V. was on, but I could see
like the outline of him, and I think about the third time that he asked me
was when I realized who he was just because of his voice.

About how far away was he from you when he was doing this
touching of you?
Q.

A.

He was sitting right at my feet, like right to the left of my feet.

Q.

Did he attempt to touch you a third time?

A.

Yes he did.

Q.

Can you tell us about that, please?

A.

He didn't make it under the blanket. I was wrapped.

Q.

Where did you feel his hand this time?

A.
I felt it under the blanket like under my leg, but he couldn't get
through the blanket.
Q.

What happened after the third time that he attempted to touch you?

A.
That was when he asked me for the third time if I knew who he
was, and I said, "Yes, Jesse, I do," and he said, "Do you want me to
leave," and I said, "Yes, I do," and he got up and he walked into my
bathroom which was right next to my bedroom - well, that's where I think
he went. I didn't get up and follow him, but it sounded like he went into the
bathroom, and that's when I called my friend who I had been staying with
prior because I didn't want to - I didn't know what to do. I didn't want to
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panic and call the cops, I didn't know what was gonna happen, so I called
my friend, and then he stayed on the phone with me while I called
dispatch.
(Tr. Trial, p.40, L.23 - p.45, L.11.) Ms. Steciuk testified to no other acts of penetration
and there was no evidence presented that she was either of unsound mind or suffering
the effects of any substances. (Tr. Trial, p.45, L.12 - p.68, L.6.)
Furthermore, the State failed to present any evidence that Mr. Elias used any
force in addition to the amount of force necessary to accomplish the act of penetration.
No evidence was presented that he used his body weight to hold Ms. Steciuk in order to

accomplish the act of penetration (see Jones, 154 Idaho at 422) or even that he
positioned her body or removed any clothing to accomplish the act of penetration. The
only evidence presented by the State was that Mr. Elias, in fact, digitally penetrated
Ms. Steciuk.
The State relies upon the fact that Ms. Steciuk felt pain and there was an injury
associated with the penetration to argue that the jury could conclude that the evidence
supports a finding that Mr. Elias used more force than was necessary to accomplish the
act penetration. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.9-10.) The
State provides this Court with a dictionary definition of the word "inherent" and argues
that "because sexual penetration can be caused without pain or injury, pain and injury
are not inherent in sexual penetration." (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for
Review, p.1 O (emphasis in the original).)

Thus, the State asserts, "a jury could

reasonably infer that the force [Mr.] Elias uses was more that the force necessary to
merely cause the digital penetration."

(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for

Review, p.10.) The State's argument is logically challenged.
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The word "inherent" as used by the Jones Court, modifies the term "force" as
in I.C. § 18-6101(4). i.e., inherent force refers to the amount of force needed to
accomplish the act of penetration itself.

See Jones, 154 Idaho at 421-422.

In other

words, the term "inherent force" applies to the cause of the penetration. The State,
however, erroneously applies the term "inherent" to the effect of the penetration noting
that "pain and injury are not inherent in sexual penetration." (Respondent's Brief in
Support of Petition for Review, p.10.) The fact that Ms. Steciuk suffered an injury and
felt the pain associated with that injury supports a conclusion that her vagina was
digitally penetrated, not that Mr. Elias used an amount force in excess of the amount of
force necessary to accomplish the act of penetration itself. This Court should reject the
State's analysis.
The State failed to present any evidence during the trial, and does not cite to any
evidence in this appeal, that would lead the jury to conclude that the fact of pain and
injury was anything other than incidental to the penetration itself. The State presented
the testimony of Dr. Amon, who examined Ms. Steciuk and discovered the injury, and
who opined that a finger or other object could cause the injury. (Tr. Trial, p.95, L.20 p.106, L.10.) The State presented no testimony from Dr. Amon or anyone else as to the
amount of force necessary to cause the injury, let alone whether that amount of force
would have to be in excess of the amount of force necessary to cause the penetration
itself.

(See generally, Tr. Trial.)

The fact that there was pain and injury does not

support a conclusion that Mr. Elias used more force than necessary to accomplish the
act of penetration. Pain and injury can be incidental to consensual penetration where
no extrinsic force is used, just as pain and injury may be absent from non-consensual
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penetration where no extrinsic force is used. The injury and associated pain suffered by
Ms. Steciuk is not sufficient to demonstrate that Mr. Elias uses more force than was
necessary to commit the act of penetration; thus, the State failed to present sufficfent
evidence to support the conviction.
There is, without question, a problem with Idaho Code§ 18-6608, in that it does
not criminalize the behavior that the jury found Mr. Elias had engaged in. Nevertheless,
this Court does not have the power to re-write § 18-6608 to criminalize Mr. Elias'
conduct no matter how abhorrent it may be.

See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional

Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-893 (2011) (noting that the power to correct a
socially or otherwise unsound statute lies with the legislature, and not the judiciary).
Neither the executive branch nor this Court has the power to make morally
reprehensible conduct criminal. This Court should reject the State's argument and find
that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias' conviction in this
case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Elias respectfully requests that this Court vacate his penetration by a foreign
object conviction and the resulting sentence imposed.
DATED this 2ih day of November, 2013.

JASON C. Pl
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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